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DDR	and	Return	in	the	DRC	–	A	Foolish	Investment	or
Necessary	Risk?
Tatiana	Carayannis	and	Aaron	Pangburn	argue	that	it	is	time	to	rethink	Disarmament,	Demobilisation	and
Reintegration	programs	in	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo.
This	article	is	part	of	our	#LSEReturn	series,	exploring	themes	around	Displacement	and	Return.
After	numerous	cycles	of	violence,	ceasefires,	and	peace	deals,	thousands	of	Congolese	former	rebels	have
demobilised,	disarmed,	and	tried	to	return	to	their	communities	of	origin	in	search	of	a	better	life.	Some	entered
formal,	internationally-supported	Disarmament,	Demobilisation	and	Reintegration	(DDR)	programs	(often	with
support	of	the	UN	or	World	Bank),	received	skills	training	and/or	financial	assistance,	while	others	self-demobilised
and	embarked	on	the	challenge	of	return	reliant	on	their	own	connections	to	survive.	Despite	the	high	numbers	of
combatants	who	have	participated	in	these	programs,	armed	groups	continue	to	plague	the	Democratic	Republic	of
Congo	(DRC).	The	remobilisation	of	ex-combatants	is	quite	frequent,	and	few	realise	the	improvement	of	livelihoods
these	programs	promise.	Even	with	the	evolution	of	DDR	policy,	which	now	recognises	the	need	to	integrate
communal	social-economic	development,	in	practice,	immediate	security	gains	are	still	prioritised	over	sustained
efforts	at	supporting	reintegration	and	return.	This	lack	of	support	and	attention	to	demobilised	combatants	is	part	of
the	purpose	for	the	Politics	of	Return	project,	as	few	have	tried	to	analyse	how	they	manage	the	difficulties	of
everyday	life,	and	engage	with	unfamiliar	public	authorities.	Frustration	and	disappointment	are	often	the	most
prevalent	sentiments	and	in	some	communities	in	the	DRC,	the	demobilised	have	been	branded	the	“eternally
dissatisfied.”[i]
Democratic	Republic	of	Congo
The	latest	DDR	plan,	the	third	major	national	initiative	since	the	end	of	the	Congo	Wars	in	2002,	was	finalised	in	July
2014,	with	the	intention	to	address	the	approximate	12,000	combatants	remaining	in	the	DRC.	However,	the	rollout
of	this	plan	encountered	many	obstacles,	including	the	high-profile	starvation	tragedy	in	Kotakoli	camp	where	over
100	ex-combatants	and	their	dependents	died	awaiting	the	next	stage	of	the	program.	Since	then,	the	process	has
continued	to	run	into	delays,	varied	significantly	from	the	original	text,	and	even	prompted	episodes	of	protest	and
violent	crackdowns	between	ex-combatants	and	soldiers	in	Kitona	military	base	outside	of	Muanda,	Kongo	Central.
This	had	led	to	a	great	deal	of	reluctance	from	donors	to	fund	it	and	from	armed	actors	to	lay	down	their	arms.
A	photo	from	Gemena	Airport,	where	the	Army	is	awaiting	the	arrival	of	political	“notables”									
																Image	Credit:	Tatiana	Carayannis
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Despite	three	years	of	activity,	a	recent	mapping	of	groups	in	the	DRC	identified	that	there	are	still	approximately	120
armed	factions	in	the	eastern	part	of	the	country.	MONUSCO,	the	United	Nations	peacekeeping	mission	has	picked
up	much	of	the	slack	to	support	the	government’s	implementing	agency	(UEPNDDR).	The	UN	continues	to	support
1,366		FDLR		combatants		and		their		dependents	(60		per	cent	are	children)	at	three	camps	located		in	Walungu	
(South		Kivu)		and		Kisangani		(Tshopo)		and	Kanyobagonga		(government-run	in	North		Kivu).	Two	additional	military
camps	Kamina	(Haut-Lomami)	and	Kitona	(Kongo	Central)	hold	an	additional	1000	ex-combatants,	where	they
administer	reintegration	preparation	training	with	World	Bank	support.	The	UN	in	their	latest	strategic	review	has
recommended	that	the	mission	redirect	its	support	from	these	camps,	and	focus	on	more	flexible	structures	where
community-violence-reduction	programming	can	more	effectively	target	both	ex-combatants	and	other	youth	at	risk.
In	Eastern	Congo,	MONUSCO	has	37	projects	targeting	these	vulnerable	populations.	However,	detailed	in	the
Strategic	Review,	3,777	ex-combatants	have	completed	their	skills	training	and	already	been	sent	back	to	the	east
for	“long-term	community-based	reintegration.”
Nearly	all	of	the	first	cohort	of	ex-combatants	have	received	their	reintegration	kits,	however	as	of	September	2017,
only	40	per	cent	of	the	members	of	the	host	community	also	participating	in	the	program	(out	of	a	planned	1890)
have	collected	theirs.	This	difference	will	likely	feed	into	the	perception	in	Congo	that	those	who	took	up	arms	in	DRC
receive	undue	privilege	over	the	rest	of	the	community.	Moreover,	this	program	is	occurring	in	a	context	where	state
security	services	and	armed	groups	continue	to	engage	in	predatory	behaviour	against	the	population,	and	displays
of	non-violent	protest	are	often	squashed	with	force.	Uncertainty	over	the	proposed	electoral	calendar	is	likely	to
further	intensify	local	competition	for	power	and	resources.
Over	the	next	six	months,	the	UEPNDDR	and	other	international	implementing	partners	(Caritas,	FAO	and	IMPP)	will
monitor	whether	this	new	group	of	demobilised	feel	socially	accepted,	if	they	are	maintaining	their	chosen	economic
activity,	and	if	they	are	meeting	their	household	food	consumption	targets.[1]	However,	by	only	looking	into	these
narrow	outcome	indicators,	this	program	will	suffer	the	same	fate	of	previous	DDR	initiatives	in	Congo	that	failed	to
incorporate	or	understand	the	true	political	and	security	risks	to	the	program’s	success.	How	does	ex-combatants’
return	influence	local	authority	in	the	community?	Will	they	be	targets	for	remobilisation	by	neighbouring	armed
groups,	or	the	political	elite?	How	does	their	return	affect	the	local	economy,	or	the	communal	social	balance?	Will
their	return	inspire	claims	for	justice?	These	are	just	a	few	of	the	additional	questions	that	will	help	determine	whether
an	effective	return	of	ex-combatants	is	possible	in	2018	in	the	DRC.
Final	Reflections
At	a	broader	level,	the	challenges	of	returning	combatants	in	the	DRC	prompts	a	more	fundamental	question.	Are
these	programs	actually	having	the	opposite	effect	of	their	original	intent?	In	the	absence	of	a	major	national	buy-in
and	a	genuine	political	framework	to	broker	community	divides,	are	these	small	investments	in	community
development,	and	perhaps	some	short-term	training	for	the	ex-combatants	worth	the	risk	of	inspiring	new	rebels	and
creating	a	new	generation	of	dissatisfied	former	fighters?	Some	might	say	yes	by	highlighting	the	second	chance
these	programs	present	to	thousands	of	young	Congolese,	others	could	argue	in	a	moment	of	extreme	political
tension	and	armed	rebellion,	the	risks	to	DDR	III	might	outweigh	these	possible	rewards.	Nevertheless,	wherever	one
ends	up	in	this	debate,	ignoring	the	political	implications	of	return	at	this	current	moment	is	dangerous.	The	UN’s
increased	emphasis	on	violence	reduction	programming	is	welcome,	and	if	other	implementing	partners	do	not	have
the	capacity	or	interest	to	monitor	these	important	variables,	local	organisations,	academics	and	researchers	must	fill
this	gap	or	the	errors	of	the	past	DDR	processes	will	once	again	haunt	the	prospects	for	a	more	peaceful	Congo.
Find	out	more	about	the	Politics	of	Return		and	our	Trajectories	of	Displacement	research	projects,	which
are	based	at	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	and	funded	by	ESRC/AHRC.
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The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
[i]	Interview,	Gemena,	February	2015
[1]	The	program	also	offers	support	to	ex-combatant	households,	psychosocial	support,	and	take	note	of	the	special
needs	of	female	ex-combatants,	but	these	components	of	the	reintegration	program	are	not	evaluated	until	after	the
initial	phase.	DRC	Reinsertion	and	Reintegration	Project	–	Results	Framework,	World	Bank
Africa at LSE: DDR and Return in the DRC – A Foolish Investment or Necessary Risk? Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-26
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2018/03/26/ddr-and-return-in-the-drc-a-foolish-investment-or-necessary-risk/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/
